WHY DON'T AMERICAN CITIES BURN VERY OFTEN?

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Prompted by the 2005 urban riots in France, this article asks why, with very few exceptions, American cities have not experienced widespread civil disorders since the late 1970s, especially when many of the conditions underlying the earlier disorders persist or have worsened. The answer lies in three factors: the changing ecology of power, techniques for managing marginalization, and distinctive U.S. approaches to the incorporation and control of immigrants.

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In October 2005, rioting erupted in at least 300 cities and towns across France. The riots were the worst France had experienced since 1968. The October 27 deaths by electrocution of two teenagers of North African and Malian origins when climbing a fence to escape what they believed to be police pursuit touched off the riots, which were stoked a few days later by the discovery of an unexplained tear gas grenade inside a prayer hall in Clichy. In two weeks, youths from immigrant working-class suburbs burned 9,000 cars as well as "a theater, some social centers, day care centers, gyms, even a post office or two."[1] Mass joblessness, spatial isolation in ethnic ghettos, police abuse, and cultural discrimination fueled anger at the police that erupted on French streets.

As in France, immigrants are transforming U.S. cities, which, already highly segregated by race, contain zones of exclusion characterized by poverty and joblessness. But American cities do not burn. Even the botched response to Hurricane Katrina did not provoke civil violence. In fact, with the exception of Liberty City, Miami, in 1980, and south-central Los Angeles in 1992, American cities have not burned since the early 1970s.[2] Violence, however, has

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not disappeared from American cities. It has been transformed. Anger and frustration turn inward, exploding in gang warfare, homicide, and random killing in drive-by shootings.[3] But civil violence—burning, looting, sniping at police—actions aimed largely at symbols and agents of exclusion and exploitation remain part of urban history, not live possibilities in the urban present. What accounts for the absence of civil violence on American city streets?

I refer to these events—the burning, looting, and sniping at police—as civil violence for two reasons. One is to sidestep the politically charged debate over whether to refer to them as riots or rebellions by using a term that is less evaluative and more analytically precise. The second reason is to distinguish these events from individual violence, terrorist violence, and criminal violence. In practice, all these forms of violence overlap; distinctions among them are far from neat. Nonetheless, they are something more than ideal types. Most violent activities are readily identified as more one than the others. "Riots," terrorism, and gang warfare are instances of collective violence, in Charles Tilly's definition, "episodic social interaction" that:

> immediately inflicts physical damage on persons and/or objects. . . . involves at least two perpetrators of damage; and results at least in part from coordination among persons who perform the damaging acts.[4]

The components of collective violence combine in endless varieties and explode in myriad forms. But, always, these three features remain its core.

Civil violence differs from both terrorist and criminal violence, even though the latter two fall neatly under Tilly's definition of collective violence. Terrorism—such as bombing the World Trade Center and the federal office building in Oklahoma City and the events of 9/11—is usually carefully planned in advance and orchestrated by individuals and groups from outside the site attacked. Its purpose is to punish, seek revenge, and strike fear; killing is central, not incidental, in its mission. In all these ways it differs from the civil violence that erupted on the nation's streets. I call the drive-by shootings, gang warfare, and violence accompanying drug dealing criminal violence.[5] Criminal differs from civil violence in one crucial way: it does not make claims on the state. The shift from collective to criminal violence after about 1970 is why American cities can be at once so violent and so tranquil.

It is both presumptuous and a tricky sociological problem to explain why something did not happen. It is presumptuous because it assumes that civil violence was to be expected, not exceptional. It is a tricky sociological problem because theories usually try to explain events, not their absence. But in the case of urban civil violence, the question is legitimate for two reasons. First, it can be re-framed positively as an attempt to locate the mechanisms of social control in the United States. I use social control as defined by Ira Katznelson—the means "for the fashioning of order in societies faced with the disjunction

between the formal legal equality of citizenship and the franchise and the structural inequities produced by the routine operation of the political economy." Operating virtually everywhere, social control plays itself out differently from society to society, varying with the peculiarities of local and national contexts. In the United States in the years since the civil violence of the late 1960s and early 1970s, an official commitment to universal citizenship rights and equal opportunity has confronted widening economic inequality and continued racial disparities. In this situation, civil peace has depended on, in Katznelson's apt characterization, a distinctive idiom, grammar, and set of expectations, to maintain social order and avert civil violence.[6]

Second, the question why widespread civil violence failed to recur is legitimate because a number of the conditions thought to have precipitated the eruption of civil violence in the 1960s have either persisted or grown worse. Consider the 1968 analysis of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (the Kerner Commission), appointed by President Lyndon Johnson. The commission unequivocally—and to the intense displeasure of the president—dismissed the idea that civil disorders—its term for civil violence—reflected Communist agitation.[7] In almost every instance, police actions had ignited long-standing grievances whose roots lay in racism and economic deprivation. The commission's "basic conclusion" was the memorable and arresting observation: "Our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal."[8]

Thomas J. Sugrue and Andrew P. Goodman point out that added to these grievances was a sense that institutions had failed. Government, schools, police, and the economy: none of these delivered on their promises. In the 1960s, the stunning disjunction between the ideals of equal justice and opportunity embodied in American political rhetoric and the reality of everyday life undercut the legitimacy of institutions, loosening the hold of social control, facilitating the eruption of rage and frustration on the nation's streets. Writing about Plainfield, NJ, Sugrue and Goodman observe:

> Plainfield's formal political institutions had failed, the city's civil rights organizations were struggling, and efforts to reform the police department, integrate the school district, and institute a local War on Poverty all fizzled. In the context of multiple, reinforcing institutional failures, many black Plainfielders grew increasingly discontented. West Enders' sense of grievance and outrage mounted—and in the process, young people in the neighborhood began to fashion an alternative politics of resistance and rebellion.[9]

A sense of institutional failure spread far beyond the streets of American cities. Revulsion against Cold War politics—the diplomatic stalemate between nuclear powers, the Vietnam War, and the post–World War II growth of impersonal and bureaucratic domestic institutions—provoked convulsions across the globe, cresting in 1968 in what Jeremi Suri refers to as a "global wave of urban protests." Political power "lost its social component—its ability to command

domestic obedience *without* force—in short its legitimacy." In the United States, "a growing cohort of young Americans—black and white—believed that they could redress inequality and end the war in Vietnam only through increased violence." In 1968, student radicals and Black Panther members "forged loose alliances" that terrified the nation's political leaders.[10]

In the decades following the Kerner Commission, with the notable exception of the Vietnam War, most of the conditions identified in its report as precipitating civil violence did not disappear. Comparing conditions in Los Angeles before the civil violence of 1965 and 1992, a team of scholars pointed to the continuities: "a division between the suburbs and central city, the loss of decent-paying blue-collar jobs in the service economy that was replacing the industrial one, growing income inequality, and the demographic transformation of the region through Latino and Asian immigration [compounded by] the persistent racism of the Los Angeles Police Department."[11] Nationally, between 1940 and 1967, income inequality drifted lower before reversing direction after 1973. After 1973, as real working class wages spiraled downward, income inequality jumped. By 2000, income inequality had increased to approximately its level in the late 1940s. In 1982 dollars, the average weekly wage of production and non-supervisory workers on nonfarm payrolls dropped from $315.38 in 1973 to $254.87 in 1993 before moving modestly upward.[12] Even worse, the proportion of African American men out of the regular labor force soared. Among twenty six- to thirty-year-old black men, labor force non-participation leaped from about 9 percent in 1940 to 30 percent in 2000.[13] The number incarcerated also skyrocketed, jumping 82 percent during the 1990s; 49 percent of prisoners compared to 13 percent of the overall population were black. On any given day, one of three twenty- to twenty-nine-year-old black men was either in jail or on probation or parole.[14] Nor did allegations of police violence disappear as, for instance, in reactions to the 1997 brutalizing of Abner Louima while in the custody of New York City police or the fatal shooting in Cincinnati of nineteen-year-old Timothy Thomas by a white police officer during an on-foot pursuit. Indeed, alleged police brutality directed against motorist Rodney King sparked the 1992 civil violence in Los Angeles. New episodes of police brutality only underlined continued institutional failure. Police departments professionalized; waves of reform swept across urban schools; job training programs proliferated; new government incentives promised to recreate markets in inner cities. But city schools by and large continued to fail; the police remained problematic; chronic joblessness increased; and inner cities remained bleak.[15]

Other conditions that had contributed to the 1960s civil violence also worsened. Racial segregation increased until the 1990s, reaching historic highs. Although African American poverty rates declined, within cities the spatial concentration of poverty intensified. "Between 1970 and 1980," points out sociologist Paul Jargowsky, "the spatial concentration of the poor rose dramatically in many U.S. metropolitan areas. The number of poor people living

in high-poverty areas doubled; the chance that a poor black child resided in a high-poverty neighborhood increased from roughly one-in-four to one-in-three; and the physical size of the blighted sections of many central cities increased even more dramatically."[16] In *American Apartheid*, Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton coined the term "hyper-segregation" to describe the areas where a third of African Americans lived.[17] Segregation increased partly because African Americans migrated in huge numbers to northern, midwestern, and far western cities where they faced housing discrimination; it increased, as well, because whites, in huge numbers, fled cities. By 2000, only 21 percent of white Americans remained in central cities. Ethnic transition added to urban tensions as immigration, primarily from Asia and Latin America, soared after 1980, accounting for one-third of population growth in the 1990s. Recent immigrants settled mainly in cities.[18]

Cities confronted the problems that resulted from poverty, inequality, segregation, and ethnic transformation with fewer resources than in the 1960s and early 1970s. The federal government slashed direct aid to cities; other programs—such as public assistance—took major hits; the real value of the minimum wage spiraled downward. The safety net increasingly spread under Americans in the Great Society years contracted, heightening vulnerability and insecurity. Between 1980 and 1990, the share of big-city expenses covered by federal aid dropped from 22 percent to 6 percent while state aid held constant. Between 1970 and 1996, in real dollars, the median Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefit dropped 51 percent while the minimum wage sank to its lowest value since 1955.[19]

Poverty, inequality, chronic joblessness, segregation, police violence, ethnic transition, a frayed safety net: surely, these composed a combustible ensemble of elements, which a reasonable observer might have expected to ignite. In 1985, two sociologists who studied crime and violence observed: "the ghetto poor were virtually untouched by the progress that has been made in reducing racial and ethnic discrimination. . . . We thus face a puzzle of continued, even increasing, grievance and declining attempts to redress grievance through collective protest and violence."[20] Writing in 1988, Tom Wicker pointed to the same puzzle. The "urban ghetto is, if anything, more populous, confining, and poverty-ridden than in 1968." Yet, the "urban riots that generated so much alarmed attention twenty years ago have long since vanished—rather as if a wave had risen momentarily on the sea of events and then subsided."[21] Why did no one light the match?

No single reason explains why American cities did not burn. Rather, the relative absence of civil violence resulted from the concatenation of several factors. These fall under three broad headings: the ecology of power, the management of marginalization, and the incorporation and control of immigrants.

THE ECOLOGY OF POWER

Attempts to breach the boundaries that separate hostile groups activate collective violence. Boundary change, writes Charles Tilly, "strongly affects the likelihood, intensity, scale, and form of collective violence."[22] Boundaries matter because they guard both identities and interests. They reinforce relations—"you-me and us-them"—that structure identities which, in turn, solidify over time. At the same time, cross-boundary inequalities accelerate the accumulation of advantages and resources through a process Tilly calls "opportunity hoarding." That is why attempts to break through boundaries inevitably result in conflict.[23] Throughout the history of American cities, boundary challenges often precipitated collective violence when, for example, white protestants attacked Irish Catholics in antebellum Philadelphia and Boston, or when African Americans tried to breach racial segregation in 1920s Detroit and 1940s Chicago.[24] The northward migration of African Americans after World War II constituted the greatest challenge yet to ethnic boundaries within predominantly white cities. Between 1950 and 1970, the black population of many cities skyrocketed: in Newark from 17 percent to 54 percent, in Chicago from 14 percent to 34 percent, and in Detroit from 16 percent to 44 percent.[25] The number of African Americans in Los Angeles soared from 63,744 to 763,000 between 1940 and 1970. The city's African American population spiked so rapidly, writes historian Josh Sides, "that even the most determined could not ignore it. Whites were now forced to interact with blacks to a degree unimaginable in prewar Los Angeles, a situation that generated unprecedented racial conflict. . . ."[26] To many white residents, black migrants threatened to raise taxes for social services, overwhelm public schools, depress property values, and inject a rough new culture into daily life. To preserve existing boundaries, whites often turned to violence—a response documented with painful detail by historians.[27] The point for this discussion is that civil violence erupted at the height of urban boundary challenge, when huge numbers of African Americans had moved in and whites had not yet moved out.

In the years following the Great Migration, as boundary challenges receded, the ecology of urban power was rearranged. Whites left central cities for suburbs where they found ways to erect new and effective borders, and many cities became majority or near-majority minority. In places such as Boston where the white working class remained strong—the African American population only increased from 5 percent to 16 percent between 1950 and 1970—civil violence sometimes erupted, especially in protests over school busing, but remained spatially contained and narrowly targeted.[28] Elsewhere, whites decamped for the suburbs and ceded effective political control of cities to African Americans, retaining only a hold on commerce and finance and gentrified pockets of downtown. After the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the number of black elected officials jumped from 100 to 1,813 in 1980.[29] Between 1970 and 2001, the

number of African American county and municipal officials rose 960 percent and 619 percent, respectively.[30] African Americans also made inroads into the police, the most visible and, often, hated agents of the local state. Cities hired African American police chiefs only in the years after the 1960s civil violence—in Cleveland in 1970, Detroit in 1976, and Chicago in 1983. In the same years, city police forces hired more African Americans, although not in numbers that matched their share of the population. In Detroit, for example, African Americans as a fraction of the police force increased from 22.3 percent in 1975 to 48.0 percent in 1987 while African Americans comprised 64.2 percent of the city's population.[31] A survey of 254 American cities found that minorities, as a share of police, increased between 1970 and 1981 from 5.1 percent to 11.6 percent while minorities as a share of total population rose from 16.7 percent to 27.6 percent—an improvement in the ratio from 3.2 to 2.3, but still a decided under-representation.[32] The irony, of course, is that African Americans inherited city governments at the moment when de-industrialization, cuts in federal aid, and white flight were decimating tax bases and job opportunities while fueling homelessness, street crime, and poverty. Newly African American-led city governments confronted escalating demands for services and the repair of crumbling infrastructures with shrinking resources and power curtailed by often hostile state governments. They were, truly, as a political scientist described in 1969, a "hollow prize."[33] Nonetheless, with so many whites gone, boundaries became less contentious, eroding one major source of civil violence.

In the United States, rural-to-urban migration inverted a world-wide pattern. Elsewhere, in the Third World as well as in France and some other European nations, the massive, post-1960s rural-to-urban migration of the landless poor found its stopping-point not in city centers, home to elites and middle classes, but on their peripheries in vast shanty towns or banlieues. Where the poor inconveniently remained in central cities, governments, often in the face of violent resistance, helped remove them through slum clearance and other perfectly legal methods of social cleansing.[34] Everywhere, however, the trends amounted to reorganizing urban space with, in Mike Davis's words, "a dramatic diminution of the intersections between the lives of the rich and poor. . . . middle-class secession from public space—as well as from any vestiges of a shared civic life with the poor. . . ."[35] Davis focuses mainly on Asia, Africa, and Latin America, but his observation applies to the United States as well as to Nicaragua, Hong Kong, and, one suspects, to Paris. The implication for the problem of civil violence is clear enough. The new ecology of urban power dampens the potential for civil violence by pairing class and racial segregation with the devolution of control over space to previously marginalized groups. Limited though it is, African American urban political power exceeds that available to residents of Third World shantytowns or Parisian banlieues.

In the 1980s, massive immigration from Latin America and Asia re-ignited urban boundary conflicts, particularly in the gateway cities where most immigrants entered. The civil violence that exploded in southwest Los Angeles in 1992 marked the first major boundary conflict since the 1960s. As the nation's major immigrant city, with Los Angles International Airport (LAX) the Ellis Island of the late twentieth century, Los Angeles was the natural site for civil violence reflecting the nation's new demography. Despite widespread fear, however, events in Los Angeles proved singular, not the first spark of a long fuse stretching across urban America.[36] Why did it prove so hard to ignite civil violence throughout the nation? The answer lies partly in a set of mechanisms that complemented the new ecology of urban power. Collectively, these mechanisms deflected civil violence by managing marginalization.

THE MANAGEMENT OF MARGINALIZATION

In one way or another, civil violence in American history usually has involved marginalized populations. They have served both as objects of attack, as in lynching, and as active participants, as in Watts in 1965. By marginalized, I mean groups largely excluded from the prerogatives and rewards that accompany full citizenship, including employment, housing, consumption, social benefits, and equal justice. Before the 1950s or 1960s, nearly all African Americans remained marginalized in one way or another. In the last half of the twentieth-century, a significant fraction moved into the American middle class. But a large share lacked work in the regular labor market, access to the best benefits of the welfare state, and the ability to match white Americans in the consumption of housing, education, and other goods. The same can be said of Puerto Ricans and many immigrants. Since the 1960s, however, deprivation rarely has translated into civil violence. Americans have learned to manage marginalization. Five mechanisms have proved crucial: selective incorporation, mimetic reform, indirect rule, consumption, repression, and surveillance. Together, they set in motion a process of de-politicization that undercuts the capacity for collective action.[37]

In recent decades, gateways to better education, jobs, income, and housing have opened to a significant fraction of African Americans and other minorities. This is what I mean by selective incorporation. As a result, African American social structure resembles the social structure of white America, albeit with a smaller middle class and fewer wealthy. Incorporation did not happen unaided. It was not the inevitable product of market forces or the working of America's democratic institutions and assimilative processes. Rather, it resulted from government and private sector sponsorship. The civil violence of the 1960s, the Civil Rights Movement, and affirmative action all encouraged selective incorporation, which depended heavily on public or quasi-public employment (that is, employment in private agencies largely dependent on

public funds). These proliferated as a result of the War on Poverty and Great Society social spending. Municipal bureaucracies increasingly controlled by African Americans provided many jobs, as did state and federal governments, where affirmative action took hold most quickly. In 2000, approximately 43 percent of African American women and 19 percent of black men worked in public or quasi-public sector jobs. Among Mexican Americans born between 1945 and 1954, the share in public or publicly funded employment was 37 percent for women and 17 percent for men. In 1970, government jobs, many funded by Great Society programs, employed 57 percent of black male college graduates and 72 percent of female college graduates.[38] Many private sector firms, prompted by affirmative action and the commercial value of diversity, also increased minority employment.

For the most part, selective incorporation constructed limited ladders of social mobility.[39] African American men entering the professions, for example, clustered largely in the human services, not in law, medicine, or the top ranks of corporate America. African American women professionals worked disproportionately as technicians, the lowest rung on the professional ladder.[40] Nonetheless, these limited ladders of mobility proved very important, fracturing African American communities along lines of class and gender (women fared far better than men) and eroding the potential for collective protest by holding out the promise of economic and occupational achievement and spreading a modest prosperity more widely than ever before—a prosperity, it should be noted, that was extremely fragile because it depended so heavily on public sector jobs.[41] When the Community Service Administration was abolished in 1981, for example, 60 percent of the 9,000 workers who lost their jobs were black.[42]

Mimetic reform also dampened the potential for collective violence. By mimetic reform, I mean measures that respond to insurgent demands without devolving real power or redistributing significant resources.[43] Mimetic reform cools out insurgencies; it does not resolve the problems that underlie them. Consider, for instance, Ira Katznelson's account of how in New York City in the late 1960s the Lindsay administration redirected demands for community control of schools in northern Manhattan to conservative ends. Through two new institutions, the Neighborhood Action Program and District School Board, the administration "refocused neighborhood politics in traditional directions. . . . by appearing to be responsive to the period's demands for community control. But their activity, at a moment of social and political crisis, not only absorbed the energies of insurgents, it also transformed their protests and rendered them harmless." The triumph of the "mimetic policy formula" substituted decentralization for community control, elections for protest, and "modest but sufficiently tantalizing distribution" for redistribution. "The noise of schooling now signified nothing."[44] Another example is corporate leadership's deflection of civil violence and black protest and its cooptation of protest leaders, described in Julia Rabig's history of the politics of urban

development in Newark, New Jersey. A third is Rebuild LA, which promised to reconstruct South Central Los Angeles after the 1992 civil violence, but delivered very little.[45]

Together, white abandonment, selective incorporation, and mimetic reform resulted in indirect rule.[46] Like colonial British imperialists who kept order through the exercise of authority by indigenous leaders, powerful white Americans retained authority over cities through their influence on minorities elected to political office, appointed to public and social service bureaucracies, and hired in larger numbers by police forces. Despite African American ascension to public office, however, real power lay elsewhere. In law cities are creatures of state government,[47] and state legislatures retain effective control of city finances, a situation underlined by the appointment of financial control boards when New York and other cities faced bankruptcy. States exercise control over cities in many other ways as well, as in education when the Illinois legislature mandated radical change in Chicago's school system or when the Pennsylvania legislature replaced Philadelphia's school board. In Pennsylvania, the state legislature in the 1990s also overturned a modest gun control law passed by the city council. Cities are profoundly influenced, too, by federal spending and regulations. In the mid-1970s, for example, the federal government flexed its muscle by setting stringent conditions for urban fiscal bailouts and drastically cutting money for public housing. Corporations also limited the autonomy of city governments by threatening to exit, taking with them needed jobs.

Thus, city leaders remained trapped between constituents who elected them and the state, national, and corporate authorities who supplied funds for their campaigns and circumscribed their actions. But indirect rule meant that civil violence or other claims on city government increasingly would be directed toward African American elected officials, African American public bureaucrats, and African American police.

The private sector also helped dampen the potential for civil violence by incorporating potential insurgents into America's Consumers' Republic.[48] In the 1960s, corporate America discovered the newly urbanized black consumer. Between 1940 and 1960, the proportion of African Americans living in urban areas increased from 48.6 percent to 73.2 percent. Corporations, recognizing a new market, quickly responded. The 1960s, writes Robert E. Weems, Jr., in *Desegregating the Dollar*, "witnessed a virtual explosion of 'how-to' articles in various advertising and trade journals offering advice on selling to African-Americans." Advertising revenues in *Ebony* magazine tripled from $3,630,804 in 1962 to $9,965,898 in 1969.[49]

With more spare cash than ever before, targeted by advertising, African Americans bought the material symbols of the good life. By 1993, the black consumer electronics market had reached $2,582 million. In the late twentieth century, the spending patterns of African Americans did not differ very much from whites (although blacks did spend less per capita on alcoholic beverages). Blacks had less income, but spent it in roughly the same way. In the

early twenty-first century, the average income of white "consumer units" was $50,742 compared to $35,994 for blacks. Blacks spent $4,186 on food, $1,124 on entertainment, $488 on personal care products, and $1,704 on apparel compared to $5,349, $2,148, $529, and $1,716, respectively, for non-Hispanic whites.[50]

In their turn toward consumption, African Americans joined post–World War II Americans who had created what historian Lizabeth Cohen calls the Consumers' Republic, an "economy, culture, and politics built around the promises of mass consumption, both in terms of the material life and the more idealistic goals of freedom, democracy, and equality."[51] The story is full of irony. Consumption demands—equal access to public accommodation, entertainment, shopping, and transportation—comprised key goals in the Civil Rights Movement.[52] They also, as Alison Isenberg has shown, helped precipitate the civil disorders of the 1960s.[53] The National Welfare Rights Movement made full membership in the Consumers' Republic—the means to enjoy an American standard of consumption—a key demand.[54] "The Consumers' Republic," claims Cohen, "in prizing broad participation in mass consumer markets, provided a wide range of black Americans—differing in locale, class, and ideology—with an available and legitimate recourse for challenging racial discrimination, particularly as other avenues—such as desegregated neighborhoods, schools, voter registration lists, and jobs—were often blocked." But the Consumers' Republic also undermined black protest. Its "focus on winning access to public accommodations and markets inevitably limited the civil rights movement, particularly in the North, because it favored those demands that grew out of, and intersected with, the mainstream discourse and assumptions of the nation, braiding the experience of black Americans with those of whites." In the process, alternatives based on black nationalism or social democratic visions of economic justice receded. "Articulating black discontent in the language of a liberal struggle to pursue individual rights in a free capitalist marketplace and then successfully securing those rights . . . only reinforced the legitimacy of the capitalist order as a way of organizing economic life."[55]

The Consumers' Republic embraced more than the black middle class. Corporations responded to the bifurcation of black social structure with segmented products and advertising. "This market segmentation," claims Weems, "prompted corporate marketers to develop class-specific advertising aimed at African Americans." In the 1970s, "blaxploitation" films, for example, "stimulated conspicuous consumption as young black males sought to emulate the lifestyles of these dubious film icons." Although the blaxploitation films proved "an extremely effective means to more fully incorporate blacks as American consumers," concludes Weems, "the millions of dollars spent visiting a fantasy world of African American triumph and achievement might have been better spent trying to effect changes in the real world."[56] As it defined the good life in terms of the endless acquisition of material goods, this relentless pursuit of consumption turned Americans, both white and black, away from politics and, especially, from the politics of the common good. "If integration

and desegregation were the call to arms of the civil rights movement," points out anthropologist Elizabeth Chin, "self-esteem claims equal prominence in contemporary discussions of racial problems and their solutions." What she terms the "commodification of race and the racialization of commodities" have accompanied "a turning away from the emphases of civil-rights oriented movements."[57] Among both black and white Americans consumption masked widening inequality, environmental degradation, and heightened insecurity with a blanket of inexpensive clothes, jewelry, and electronics, available to nearly everyone through the magic of credit. The result was the blossoming of consumer debt and bankruptcy—which reached previously unimagined heights—rather than mobilization expressed through politics or other forms of collective action. Between 1999 and 2005, credit card debt almost tripled. The average African American debt was $8,319 compared to $8,992 for whites, who had higher incomes. In 2005, 84 percent of African American cardholders, compared to 50 percent of whites, carried a balance.[58] This disparity highlights one more irony in the relation of African Americans to the Consumers' Republic: the inability of formally equal access to consumption, like formally equal access to schools or housing, to overcome historic inequalities of class and race. Full participation in the Consumers' Republic required not only desegregated shopping, but the means with which to enjoy it. As long as African Americans remained economically behind whites, they would remain second-class citizens, disproportionately dependent on plastic to acquire not just luxuries, but the very means of survival.[59]

In important respects, this sketch of African American consumption is too crude. It abstracts consumption from its context in social and family relationships, neglecting its crucial role in their maintenance, as described, for instance, by Chin in her account of consumption among poor black ten-year-olds in New Haven. Her emphasis on consumption as a collective, not just an individual, act also highlights the diversity of consumption among African Americans, its defiance of stereotypes of extravagance, and its capacity to resist and transform the intentions of marketers. Nonetheless, she argues, the aggressive promotion of consumption touches every aspect of African Americans' lives, creating near-irresistible pressures toward a preoccupation with self that undermines the will for collective struggle.[60]

By facilitating the rise of the Consumers' Republic, the private sector developed an indirect mechanism for deflecting the potential for civil violence. Public authorities deployed more direct mechanisms that relied on law enforcement. In 1968, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, which created the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), "the largest and longest federal effort to respond to the problem of crime in America."[61] Prompted by an increasing crime rate in the early 1960s, the LEAA had sought unsuccessfully to pass a crime bill. Civil violence on the nation's streets and campuses, as well in cities around the world, quickly changed the political calculus.[62] The LEAA, according to one historian,

"provided a law-and-order alternative to the social, cultural, and economic perspective of the Kerner Commission."[63] The LEAA, operating mainly through block grants to states, gave money to police forces and other parts of the criminal justice system.[64] The legislation specified that no more than one-third of federal grants go to personnel—a requirement that excluded man-power intensive programs, including most of those based in communities or social work practice. "The police, on the other hand," point out criminologists, Alan R. Gordon and Norval Morris, "could easily meet the requirements through expenditures on hardware, such as vehicles, helicopters, computers, communications equipment, and antiriot gear."[65] Thus, much LEAA money supplied technologies of repression and control. Lynn A. Curtis, president of the Eisenhower Foundation, reported:

> In its early days, LEAA distributed many grants for police hardware and command-and-control systems. The San Diego police acquired a submarine to patrol the waterfront, and Mobile, Alabama, received tanks for crowd control. . . . in our crime-control policy as in our policy in Southeast Asia, we sought to resolve problems that were social and communal in nature through high technology and big money.[66]

In 1970, an amendment to the LEAA, one of several before its abolition in 1980, eliminated the one-third requirement. Although the LEAA spent about $7.5 billion between 1969 and 1980—an unprecedented federal commitment to law enforcement—its funds, at their peak, never amounted to more than 5 percent of total spending on criminal justice.[67]

State and local governments continued to bear most of the responsibility and expense for law enforcement. Like the federal government, in the aftermath of the 1960s civil violence, they also ramped up spending. Local spending on police protection leaped from $2,001 million in 1965 to $3,803 in 1970 and $6,813 in 1975. By 1995, it had reached $58,768.[68] More money allowed local police to adopt military practices, as historian Robert Fogelson describes:

> In addition to employing the rhetoric of the 'war on crime' and stressing the martial arts in the training academies, these [police] departments ordered grenade launchers, infrared screening devices, and other weapons that were more appropriate for a military or paramilitary outfit than for a civilian police force. Chief Ed Davis even asked the Los Angeles City Council to appropriate funds for two jet helicopters. . . . In the aftermath of the 1960s riots, which overwhelmed the police forces in Los Angeles, Newark, Detroit, and several other cities, many departments attempted to turn groups of ordinary officers who were accustomed to working on their own into highly centralized and tightly disciplined riot control units. Following recommendations proposed by the FBI and the army, the departments taught these units how to form lines, circles, diamonds, wedges, and other formations that were designed to disperse unruly crowds.[69]

While local governments paid most of the cost of police, state governments picked up the largest share of the escalating cost of incarceration, which, notes criminologist Elliot Currie, since the mid-1970s has been "the strategy most consistently adopted against crime in America."[70] As a consequence, in the late twentieth century a vast carceral state, described with chilling detail by political scientist Marie Gottschalk, spread throughout the nation. State costs for correction increased from $632 million in 1965 to $1,051 million in 1970, $2,193 million in 1975, and $4,258 million in 1980.[71]

What impact did increased funding and militarized policing have on crime? Most analyses claim that the LEAA failed to reduce crime.[72] As for incarceration, even optimistic accounts, claims Currie, leave us "at best, with a remarkably meager payoff for the enormous, costly, and disruptive investment of social resources involved."[73] Indeed, crime rates, which had been increasing during the early 1960s, soared *after* the episodes of civil violence. Despite increased federal, state, and local funding, violent crime increased per 100,000 population, from 160.9 in 1960 to 200.2 in 1965, 363.5 in 1970, 487.8 in 1975, and 596.6 in 1980.[74] Nonetheless, with few exceptions, the civil violence of the 1960s did not recur. Did the militarization of policing and mass incarceration help authorities break up potential insurgencies, respond more effectively to ones that occurred, and prevent them from spreading to other cities?

In *City of Quartz*, Mike Davis limns a connection between police repression and the end of civil violence. In what he calls the August 1965 "festival of the oppressed," Davis claims, "formerly hostile [gang] groups forgot old grudges and cheered each other on against the hated LAPD and the National Guard." To everyone's surprise, the "ecumenical movement of the streets and 'hoods lasted for three or four years. Community workers, and even the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) themselves, were astonished by the virtual cessation of gang hostilities as the gang leadership joined the Revolution." This "aspiration for unity and militancy" did not sit well with authorities. Together, "the FBI's notorious COINTELPRO program and the LAPD's Public Disorder Intelligence Division . . . concentrated on destroying Los Angeles's Black Power vanguards." In this, they succeeded, but the result was not what they had hoped or predicted. "As even the *Times* recognized, the decimation of the Panthers led to a recrudescence of gangs in the early 1970s." This, Davis emphasizes, "was not merely a gang revival, but a radical permutation of Black gang culture" led by the Crips, who "blended a penchant for ultra-violence with overweening ambition to dominate the entire ghetto." In the 1970s, Davis writes, the Crips evolved "into a hybrid of teen cult and proto-Mafia."[75] The "recrudescence of gangs," he argues, also contributed to the de-politicization of ghetto youth.

> Teenagers, who today flock to hear Easy-E rap, 'It ain't about color, it's about the color of money, I love that green'—then filled the Sports Arena to listen to Stokely Carmichael, H. Rap Brown, Bobby Seale and James Forman adumbrate the unity program of SNCC and the Panthers.[76]

In Los Angles in August 1992, two major gangs, the Crips and the Bloods, entered into a truce with the hopes of both lessening violence and opening work opportunities. For a time the truce held. Measured against 1991, by June, homicides had dropped 88.2 percent, attempted murder 45 percent, and robberies 13.2 percent. "As far as I know," said Los Angles police lieutenant John Dinkin, "there have been no drive-by shootings between gangs in south and central Los Angles since the [April 1992] riots."[77] A barbecue chef whose restaurant had been under siege reported, "It's a big change in only 100 days. People can walk and not be scared of being hit by the spray."[78] The truce even extended beyond African American gangs and South Central Los Angeles, embracing Latino gangs in the San Fernando Valley while "individual efforts to initiate and maintain the truce soon developed into community-based organizations. . . ." One gang member observed, "Instead of shooting each other, we decided to fight together for black power."[79]

Instead of welcoming the truce, officials reacted skeptically, with law enforcement authorities claiming the truce "was an excuse for young gang members to unify against the police," and they constantly harassed truce leaders, even arresting a "respected leader of Homidos Uniodos, a truce organization" and, in violation of a city order that prohibited police from arresting someone solely because they suspected a federal immigration violation, handing him to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which sought to deport him. (He successfully fought the charge.)[80] Nor did authorities get the message about opportunity. Job progress remained virtually non-existent for youths over the age of twenty-one. One commentator warned, gangs "made the first step to come together in peace, to stop the madness, to stop the killing. Now they have to have some help, some training, some educational assistance."[81] He might as well have been talking to the wind, as the sad failure of Rebuild LA, the effort to reconstruct violence-torn neighborhoods solely through the private sector, soon revealed.[82]

Since then, public authorities have worked to prevent any resurgence of legitimate political activity by gangs. In 1993 and 1994, when gang summits met in a number of cities to discuss joining together around issues of economic justice, politicians and the media quickly dismissed their actions as nothing more than transparent ploys by criminals. Commenting on the response to a gang summit in Chicago, a newspaper reporter observed, "Most reports of the gang meeting have been negative. Chicago's local and national politicians have called the peace effort a joke. . . . Alderwoman Dorothy Tillman called the new movement a scam."[83] But Jesse Jackson proved supportive. In Chicago, he "embraced the leaders of the gang peace movement . . . calling their efforts 'the centerpiece of a new urban policy.'"[84]

Fewer black men, in fact, could participate in politics, even if they wanted to, because they were felons. Felony disenfranchisement laws had long been on the books in most states, but their consequences became more severe as aggressive law enforcement, including draconian drug laws, created unprecedented numbers of felons, who were disproportionately black. Adding together

incarcerated felons and former inmates barred from voting effectively disenfranchised about 1.4 million, or 13 percent, of African American men, a rate seven times the national average. Looking ahead to younger men, the situation appears even bleaker. With the current rate of incarceration, at some point in their lives 30 percent of the next generation of black men, points out The Sentencing Project, will face disenfranchisement, a fraction that rises to a possible stunning 40 percent of black men who live in states that permanently bar ex-offenders from voting.[85] Many black men, moreover, evading warrants or just fearful of potential arrest, avoid the institutions and agents of the state, thereby eliminating themselves from participation in political action.[86]

That a share of the responsibility for the turn toward criminal violence and de-politicization among African American youth rests with public authorities remains a hypothesis—intriguing, explosive in its implications, and in need of much research. Indeed, the lack of research on the question—and on the social history of policing post-1960—remains stunning and surprising. Clearly, though, the turn from politics also reflected other influences. Among the most important were disillusionment with the achievements of civil rights liberalism and Black Power. In his history of civil rights and Black Power in Philadelphia, Matthew J. Countryman writes, "A decade after it began, the Black Power movement dissipated as African Americans experienced a series of clear lessons about the limitation of their ability to change public policy at the national and local level." At the heart of the matter, observes Countryman, "Black Power advocates were never able to convince other elements of the New Deal coalition to bear the cost of its agenda for racial justice." [87]In his ethnography of the informal economy in a Chicago neighborhood, Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh shows how, even at the height of Harold Washington's mayoral administration, poor Southside Chicagoans learned a similar lesson as they found their political influence and patronage cutoff by the city's now black administration, which depended increasingly on a coalition of black middle and upper class supporters. The result was the "gradual withdrawal of grassroots persons from the mainstream black political scene."[88]

The frustrations and failed hopes that turned young African Americans away from politics and protest reflected dashed expectations among former radicals in Europe as well as the United States. "Now more cynical than idealistic," claims Suri, "dissidents learned to live under what they perceived as illegitimate—or at least deeply flawed—governments. Many turned away from their former political activism to a self-imposed isolation from what they saw as the corrupt world of state power."[89] For black Americans, the sources of disillusionment proved especially strong. In the 1970s and 1980s, as the spread of black poverty turned vast areas of cities into reservations for the black poor, as fewer black men found work in the regular labor market, as mass incarceration locked unprecedented numbers of them away, young African Americans had reason to look with skepticism at civil rights liberalism, Black Power, and, indeed, politics in general.[90]

Other factors already discussed—the Consumers' Republic, selective incorporation, and indirect rule—also facilitated de-politicization, without which the management of marginalization would have proved far more difficult. In the 1960s, black Americans lacked channels through which to make effective claims on the state. They were underrepresented in Congress, state legislatures, city councils, police forces, and in influential positions in private corporations. Other than through collective action—whether sit-ins or violence—they had few ways to force their grievances onto public attention or persuade authorities to respond. This changed as the new demography of urban politics, the victories of the Civil Rights movement, and affirmative action combined to open new channels of access. As selective incorporation bifurcated African American social structure, unprecedented numbers of African Americans found themselves elected public officials, public bureaucrats, and administrators of social service agencies. New channels of access removed one powerful justification for violent protest. African Americans who once might have led protests now held positions from which they could argue that civil violence was both unnecessary and counterproductive. Others remained in America's inner cities, struggling to get by, disenfranchised, wary of the state, disillusioned with politicians, and lacking leadership or vision strong enough to mobilize them once again to make claims on the state.

THE INCORPORATION AND CONTROL OF IMMIGRANTS

This essay has asked why the explosions that rocked African American ghettos in the 1960s failed to recur despite the persistence, in some instances intensification, of conditions—joblessness, racial segregation, unequal justice, institutional failure—that had helped fuel them. We have found answers in an ensemble of factors: ebbing border conflicts as whites, fleeing central cities, ceded control of urban space to African Americans; techniques for managing marginalization—selective incorporation, mimetic reform, consumption, indirect rule, repression, and surveillance; and in the process of de-politicization. Important as these have been, they leave the discussion framed better to fit the past than the present and future, myopic in an international context, only partially helpful in contrasting American with European experience. For the civil violence that rocked Paris and frightens other Europeans is a product of recent immigration, not of the grievances and frustrations of historically marginalized citizens.

Both European and American cities have experienced recent massive immigration.[91] Both have had to cope with infusions of low-skilled workers from different cultural traditions. But the parallels begin to end as immigrant incorporation and control take different routes. The results have important implications for the turn toward collective violence.

Two events framed the 2005-2006 academic year. In October, immigrants concentrated in Parisian banlieues and the working-class suburbs of other cities took to the streets for two weeks of collective violence. In April and May, immigrants across the United States, outraged by proposed federal legislation that would turn illegal immigrants into felons and criminalize efforts to assist them, also took to the streets. But their protests were coordinated, massive, and completely peaceful. On May 1, more than one million marched in protest rallies in cities across the United States. Most of the 400,000 marchers in Los Angeles waved American flags.[92]

The two events—civil violence in France, peaceful protest in the United States—highlight divergent relations of immigrants to the state and economy. America's immigrants sought redress through government. Their protests assumed they could realize their goals through the nation's political institutions. Despite the xenophobic wing in Congress, they approached government as a potential ally, not an enemy. They wanted nothing so much as the rights of American citizens. Their faith in the ameliorative capacity of American government marked their assimilation more effectively than their ability to speak English or whether they sang "The Star-Spangled Banner" in Spanish—an important point lost to opponents who relentlessly prophesized the submersion of American nationality in an alien sea. They were also largely employed. Labor force detachment, by and large, has been an African American, not an immigrant problem. Paradoxically, the most exploited immigrants, the undocumented, have been the most closely attached to work. They risked crossing the border—too often at the cost of their lives—precisely to work at jobs for which they had been recruited or which they knew were waiting, even though those jobs paid poorly and offered no benefits or protections.

In Paris, immigrants showed no such faith in the state, and the labor market lacked places for them. The state, after all, had pursued a relentless policy of nationalization, rejecting even benign symbols of their culture, such as wearing headscarves in school—a prohibition unthinkable in the United States. Their protests, neither planned nor coordinated, reflected frustration, rage, and alienation, and a lack of confidence in, as well as ability to access, official political channels. In this, they resembled African Americans in the 1960s more than immigrants to the United States late in the twentieth-century. These contrasting national modes of protest echoed historic relations between the working class and the state in Europe and the United States. Ira Katznelson and Margaret Weir, for example, argue that in nineteenth-century United States early white manhood suffrage built trust between the white working class and the state, leading workers to look to government for the resolution of grievances and to trust it with the education of their children. A very different situation, they contend, prevailed in Europe where workers, distrusting governments that denied them the right to vote, formulated demands against, rather than through, them.[93] In France, many immigrants and their descendants are prior Colonial subjects—a plurality of them are Algerian—once imported as cheap labor, marked by memories of fierce anti-colonial wars,

and subject to prejudice and discrimination. From the outset, this history defined their relation to the state very differently than among most immigrants to the United States.[94]

The two protests—in France in the fall and the United States in the spring—underlined differences in the relative success with which the two societies incorporated their immigrants into the life of the nation, or, more accurately, in the United States, the bifurcation between incorporation and control. In the United States, references to the second generation contained a hyphen that joined an ethnic designation to "American," as in "Mexican-American." In Europe, Mark Leon Goldberg has pointed out, the second generation, even those born in Europe, are called immigrants: "The term 'immigrant' connotes different things in continental Europe than in the United States. Generally speaking, in Europe it refers not just to emigrants from foreign countries, but to their children and in some cases grandchildren as well."[95] Only 120 of the 4,000 people arrested in the French riots of 2005 had been born outside France, yet the rioters were universally referred to as immigrants.[96] The U.S. record, of course, was far from unblemished. Beginning with the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and culminating with nationality-based quotas of the 1920s, legislation inscribed racism into immigration policy.[97] Immigrants frequently encountered hostility, discrimination, and exploitation. In the 1990s, federal and state legislation cut many of them off from important social benefits. Armed militias now roam borders in the Southwest. But the United States also always has taken some justifiable pride in its history of diversity and celebrated the contribution of its immigrants. Multiculturalism is now public policy.[98] And post-1965 immigrants, despite concentrations in gateway cities, dispersed throughout the nation faster than any immigrants in the past.[99] (As far as I know, there is no data comparing immigrant economic or occupational mobility or the educational and occupational achievement of their children in the United States and Europe.) The astonishing ascendance of immigration as a national political issue in the spring of 2006 centers on immigrants who entered the nation illegally, not on the desirability of immigration itself.

Naturalization laws both reflected and reinforced divergent paths to immigrant incorporation. In the United States, naturalization remains relatively easy—it takes, basically, five years of legal residence and a clean record; children born on U.S. soil automatically are citizens at birth. In France naturalization by marriage is easier than in the United States and, in law, waiting periods can be less. (One consequence is that naturalization rates by marriage are much higher—one-third in France compared to 7 percent in the United States.) In France, naturalization requires evidence of self-support, assimilation (French language, adoption of French habits and customs, and good moral character), and that "all family attachments are in France," although the interpretation of requirements varies with administrative discretion. Although children born in France acquire automatic eligibility for citizenship, actual citizenship requires five years residence after the age of eleven and good

moral character. Changes in naturalization laws, in fact, have been directed mainly at the second generation as right-wing governments have debated whether their citizenship should be automatic or require an application. Differences in requirements for citizenship show up in naturalization rates, which are much lower in France. For individuals over the age of eighteen, the annual rate of naturalization is about 2.75 percent in France compared to 4.8 percent in the United States. After fifteen to nineteen years of residence, naturalization rates are twenty percentage points lower in France than in the United States; after twenty-five years, naturalization rates are thirty percentage points lower.[100]

In the United States, however, not all immigrants are on a fast track to citizenship. For the huge numbers of undocumented the road to economic and civic incorporation is very different—its end difficult, if not impossible to reach, in fact deliberately blocked. As is well known, U.S. immigration policy is schizophrenic. Large segments of the economy run on cheap immigrant labor, as they once did on cheap black labor. Business interests demand and abet the flow of undocumented immigrants across borders. Undocumented immigrants are, after all, an ideal workforce, hard working, terrified, and exploitable. At the same time, public anger at undocumented immigration, long simmering, has exploded with stunning velocity, demanding still more border militarization and punitive polices toward immigrants themselves and those who employ, house, or assist them. The result, of course, undercuts potential immigrant protest. Whatever else they do, the twin threats of deportation and unemployment constitute an effective mechanism of social control that dampens the potential for civil violence among a large fraction of the nation's newcomers.[101]

Comparative immigrant incorporation and control is a much larger issue than this essay can explore in depth or detail. Rather, I want to use the evidence sketched above to make three points. First, discussion of the potential for civil violence, or its absence, in American cities must move beyond a black-white frame to include immigrants. Not only has immigration irrevocably smashed the black–white frame; it is the source of civil violence in European cities and, as such, an essential focus for comparative analysis. Second, and a point which follows, international comparisons of current-day unrest within European and American cities should focus on the process of immigrant incorporation and control. Both European nations and the United State have experienced massive immigration, but they have responded differently, with immense consequences for the integration of newcomers. Third, discussion of immigration needs to include both the positive elements that dampen the possibility of violence by facilitating incorporation and the darker story in which civil peace results in part from schizoid public policies that promote the vulnerability of a large fraction of the nation's newcomers.

The nation's avoidance of civil violence in its segregated ghettos has one other lesson for Europeans concerned about urban unrest. That lesson con-

sists of modern techniques for managing marginalization—for keeping the peace in the face of persistent, and growing, inequality. In this, America is a world leader.

NOTES

1. Luther Carpenter, "Job Redistribution à la Française," *Dissent* (Spring 2006), 28.
2. The Los Angeles violence spilled over into Las Vegas.
3. In the summer of 2006, an upsurge in this form of violence made headlines in Boston and Philadelphia. See, for instance, Larry Eichel, "In the City, any day can be a killing day," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, July 16, 2006; Barbara Boyer, "An uphill fight to stem violence," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, July 18, 2006.
4. Charles Tilly, *The Politics of Collective Violence* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3.
5. Tilly labels them "opportunistic violence." Ibid., 130-50.
6. Ira Katznelson, *City Trenches: Urban Politics and the Patterning of Class in the United States* (New York: Pantheon, 1981), 208-09.
7. *The Kerner Report: the 1968 Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (New York: Pantheon, 1988), 9.
8. Ibid., 1.
9. Thomas J. Sugrue and Andrew P. Goodman, "Plainfield Burning: Black Rebellion in the Suburban North," *Journal of Urban History* 33:4 (May 2007), 568-601.
10. Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 164, 185, 211. Italics in original.
11. Robert Gottlieb, Mark Vallianatos, Regina M. Freer, and Peter Dreier, *The Next Los Angeles: The Struggle for a Livable City* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), 126.
12. Michael B. Katz and Mark J. Stern, *One Nation Divisible: What America Was and What It Is Becoming* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006), 66.
13. Ibid., 88.
14. Ibid., 88-9.
15. On police professionalization, see Robert Fogelson, *Big City Police* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 219-42.
16. Paul Jargowsky, "Stunning Progress, Hidden Problems: The Dramatic Decline of Concentrated Poverty in the 1990s," in Alan Berube, Bruce Katz, and Robert E. Lang, eds., *Redefining Urban and Suburban America: Evidence From Census 2000*, v. 3, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2005), 138.
17. Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 74, 85-7.
18. Katz and Stern, *One Nation Divisible*, 104. For a good overview of immigration trends in American history, see Mary M. Kritz and Douglas T. Gurak, *Immigration and a Changing America* (New York and Washington, DC: Russell Sage Foundation and Population Reference Bureau, 2004).
19. Michael B. Katz, *In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America*, Tenth Anniversary Edition (New York: Basic Books, 1986), 106, 318, 297.
20. Sandra Ball-Rokeach and James F. Short, Jr., "Collective Violence: The Redress of Grievance and Public Policy" in Lynn A. Curtis, ed., *American Violence and Public Policy: An Update of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985), 165.
21. Wicker, "Introduction" in *Kerner Report*, xiii.
22. Charles Tilly, *Identities, Boundaries, and Social Ties* (Boulder and London: Paradigm Publishers, 2005), 147. See also, Tilly, *Politics of Collective Violence*, 75.
23. Tilly, *Identities*, 8-9.
24. Kevin Boyle, *Arc of Justice: A Saga of Race, Civil Rights, and Murder in the Jazz Age* (New York: Henry Holt, 2004); Arnold R. Hirsch, *Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago 1940-1960* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

25. Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung. Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origins, 1970 to 1990, For Large Cities and Other Urban Place in the United States. U.S. Census Bureau. Population Division. Working Paper no. 76. February 2005.

26. Josh Sides, *L.A. City Limits: African American Los Angeles from the Great Depression to the Present* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003), 2, 44.

27. Hirsch, *Making the Second Ghetto*; Thomas J. Sugrue, *Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).

28. Gerald Gamm, *Urban Exodus: Why the Jews Left Boston and the Catholics Stayed* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); J. Anthony Lukas, "*Common Ground: A Turbulent Decade in the Lives of Three American Families* (New York: Knopf, 1985); Lillian B. Rubin, *Busing and Backlash: White Against White in a California School District* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Ronald P. Formisano, *Boston Against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991).

29. Ball-Rokeach and Short, "Collective Violence," 161.

30. "Tracking Change: a Look At the Growth of Black Elected Officials in the United States, Based on Reports by the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies". Chart. *New York Times*. March 29, 2006.

31. W. Marvin Dulaney, *Black Police in America* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996), 121-22.

32. Ball-Rokeach and Short, "Collective Violence," 163.

33. H. Paul Friesema, "Black Control of Central Cities: The Hollow Prize," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* (March 1969), 75.

34. Mike Davis, *Planet of Slums* (London and New York: Verso, 2006), 37, 111, 114.

35. Davis, *Planet of Slums*, 119.

36. I recall some stores in West Philadelphia, where I live, boarding up their windows in anticipation of rioting, which did not occur.

37. I use *mechanisms* in Charles Tilly's definition as a "form of delimited class of events that change relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations" and *processes* as "frequently occurring combinations or sequences of mechanisms." Charles Tilly, *Identities, Boundaries, and Social Ties* (Boulder and London: Paradigm Publishers, 2005), 28.

38. Ball-Rokeach and Short, "Collective Violence," 162. On African American public employment, see also Roger Waldinger, *Still the Promised City? African-Americans and New Immigrants in Post-Industrial New York* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996).

39. For the concept of limited ladders of mobility, I am indebted to John Foster, "Nineteenth Century Towns: A Class Dimension," in H. J. Dyos, *The Study of Urban History* (London: St. Martin's, 1968), 281-399.

40. Katz and Stern, *One Nation Divisible*, 92.

41. Sides, *L.A. City Limits*, 88, 91.

42. Ball-Rokeach and Short, "Collective Violence," 160.

43. For the idea of mimetic reform, I am indebted to Katznelson, *City Trenches*, 177, 187.

44. Katznelson, *City Trenches*, 179, 187.

45. Julia Rabig, "Broken Deal: Devolution, Development, and Civil Society in Newark, New Jersey: 1960-1990," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2007, ch. 2.

46. The idea of indirect rule applied to African American ghettos was developed as part of the theory of internal colonialism advanced by black writers in the late 1960s. See, for example, Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America* (New York: Random House, 1967).

47. Gerald E. Frug, *City Making: Building Communities Without Building Walls* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

48. The term is from Lizabeth Cohen, *A Consumers' Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America* (New York: Knopf, 2003).

49. Robert E. Weems, Jr., *Desegregating the Dollar: African American Consumption in the Twentieth Century* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 71, tables 4.1, 75.

50. Weems, *Desegregating the Dollar*, 107; *The 1993/94 report on the Buying Power of Black America* (Target Market News Group, Inc.: Chicago, 1993), 22; *Household Spending: Who Spends How Much on What* (New Strategies and Publications: Ithaca, NY, 2005), 125-26.

51. Cohen, *Consumers' Republic*, 7.

52. In his history of youth in post-war West Philadelphia, Carl Nightingale claims that, rather than being disaffected from the American mainstream, in their frustrated aspirations as consumers young

African-Americans are the most American of Americans. Carl Husemoller Nightingale, *On the Edge: A History of Poor Black Children and Their American Dreams* (New York: Basic Books, 1993).

53. Alison Isenberg, *Downtown America: A History of the Place and the People Who Made It* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 203-54.

54. Felicia Kornbluh, "To Fulfill Their 'Rightly Needs': Consumerism and the National Welfare Rights Movement," *Radical History Review* 69 (Fall 199), 76-112.

55. Cohen, *Consumers' Republic*, 7, 88-89, 90.

56. Weems, *Desegregating the Dollar*, 90, 100.

57. Elizabeth Chin, *Purchasing Power: Black Kids and American Consumer Culture* (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 168-69.

58. Tamara Dracut et al., The Plastic Safety Net: Findings from a National Survey of Credit Card Debt Among Low- and Middle-Income Households (Demos and Center for Responsible Lending, 2005), 8; Jennifer Wheary, *The Future of the Middle Class: African Americans, Latinos, and Economic Opportunity* (Demos: New York, 2006), 22.

59. The way inequality structures consumption is a major theme of Chin in *Purchasing Power*.

60. Chin, *Purchasing Power*, 1-26, 88, 115.

61. Alan R. Gordon and Norval Morris, "Presidential Commissions and the Law Enforcement Administration" in Lynn A. Curtis ed., *American Violence and Public Policy: An Update of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 117.

62. Kenneth O'Reilly, "The FBI and the Politics of Riots, 1964-1968," *Journal of American History*, 75:1 (June 1988), 91-114; Suri, *Power and Protest*, 182-212.

63. Ibid, 113.

64. Fogelson, *Big City Police*, 220.

65. Gordon and Morris, "Presidential Commissions," 125.

66. Lynn A. Curtis, "Introduction," in Curtis, *American Violence*, 7-8.

67. Robert A. Diegeleman, "Federal Financial Assistance for Crime Control," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, 73:3 (Autumn 1982), 1001.

68. Richard Sutch, "Criminal Justice Expenditures, by Level of Government: 1902-1996 in S. Carter, S. S. Gartner et al., *Historical Statistics of the United States Millennial Edition Online* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006 [http://husu/Cambridge.org]), Table Ec1159-1178.

69. Fogelson, *Big City Police*, 220.

70. Elliott Currie, "Crimes of Violence and Public Policy: Changing Directions," in Curtis, *American Violence*, 44.

71. Sutch, "Criminal Justice Expenditures."

72. Congressional Budget Office, "Federal Law Enforcement Assistance: Alternative Approaches," April 1978, xii. See also, Malcolm M. Feeley and Austin D. Surat, *The Policy Dilemma: Federal Crime Policy and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1968-1978* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980).

73. Currie, "Crimes of Violence," 45.

74. "Estimated rates of crime known to police, by type of offense, 1960-1997," *Historical Statistics*, Series Ec11-20.

75. Mike Davis, *City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles* (Vintage: New York, 1992), 297-300.

76. Davis, *City of Quartz*, 298.

77. Haya El Nasser and Jonathan T. Lovitt, "Frustration Makes Gang Truce More Tenuous," *USA Today*, August 6, 1992, 9A.

78. Op. cit.

79. Gottlieb et al., *The Next Los Angeles*, 126.

80. Gottlieb et al., *Next Los Angeles*, 126-27.

81. Nasser and Lovitt, "Frustration."

82. Gottlieb et al., *Next Los Angeles*, 178-83.

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101. Tichenor, *Dividing Lines*, is especially sharp on the contradictory elements in the politics of immigration.

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